Governance and Public Goods
In developing countries, tribes, clans, religious groups and other traditional leaders often control parallel governance zones outside the reach of the state. How does governance fare in these traditional zones relative to governance exercised by state institutions? To explore plausible mechanisms, we collected a household survey in over 90 villages. Using a geographic discontinuity approach to identify causal effects, we find strong evidence that political autonomy enhances development outcomes for indigenous communities in southern Mexico. In communities with party-based political systems we find that provision of basic services is politically mediated, distributed to households based on clientelism. In indigenous villages, direct participatory democracy practices lead instead to a more egalitarian distribution of services with a less notable anti-poor bias.
Contact
Beatriz Magaloni
Funding provided by
• FSI Action Fund
Projects
Clientelism and Distortion of Anti-Poverty Policies
Program on Poverty and Governance Project
Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement and Local Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico
Program on Poverty and Governance Project



